The
Lancaster house agreement of 1979 gave birth to a land policy in Zimbabwe known
as the willing buyer willing seller principle. The main thrust of this essay is
to show the extent to which the willing buyer willing seller principle managed
to solve the land question in Zimbabwe between 1979 and 2000. In this essay the
contribution of the willing buyer willing seller in solving land problem is going
to be discussed. That is its strength and weaknesses shall be central aspects
to be discussed.
Willing
buyer willing seller principle was a policy to meet 50% of the cost of the cost
of land purchase and of the investments and it required to convert large
commercial farms into viable resettlement areas for peasants or communal
farming (encyclopaedia)
In
1980, more land was available than could be acquired, but this also signifies
the high cost of acquiring land. In addition the land provided at the market
was less productive. The land occurred in pockets around the county marking its
difficult to effect a systematic and managed land reform. The land failed to
meet the demand for resettlement because resettlement was not meant to share
land equally between whites and blacks. 6000 thousand white farmers owned 15.5
million hectares while 7.5 million Zimbabweans had 6.6 million hectares.
Therefore one can say that the willing buyer willing seller principle failed to
solve the land question between 1979 and 2000.
Moreover,
the willing buyer willing seller basis was never going to adequately solve the
problem given that it depended on the will of the seller and the financial
capability of the buyer (Moyo 2005), as a result between 1980 and 1990, the
government acquired only 40% of the targeted 8 million hectares 70000 of the
targeted 162 000 families were resettled. Therefore, following this explanation,
one can note that only a minority of discontented group was resettled hence the
willing buyer willing seller was a fiasco in solving the land problem.
The
concept of willing buyer willing seller means a completely voluntary
transaction between the seller and the buyer, in this regard, the principle
accurately denotes the lack of compulsion on the land owner. The farmers who
were in holding of the best and bulk of the land were unwilling to offer the
land for resettlement. Therefore, this unwillingness to offer the land for
redistribution and lack of compulsion meant that the land was to remain in the
hands of the whites minority, hence the land grievances of the Zimbabweans
remained via willing buyer willing seller principle unsolved.
The
willing buyer willing seller was gradual instead of being instant and dictated
by the market considering the ten years no amendment basing on chapter 16. This
implied that the whites would remain on the rich agro-ecological regions throughout
these regions hence no land redistribution. Instead of promoting equitable land
distribution between the whites and the dispossessed Africans the racial
imbalance was perpetuated tilted in favour of the whites (CFU 2002). This means
that the Lancaster House Constitution paid little or no attention in saving the
land issues in Zimbabwe. Therefore, one can say that the principle of willing
buyer willing seller failed to address the land question between 1979 up to 2000.
The
donors stopped funding the reform. Tony Blair actually denied accountability of
offering money for resettlement accusing the Zimbabwean government to
corruption. He accused Zimbabwean government of diverting funds for
resettlement to other ministries such as transport. Therefore one cannot that
the principle of willing buyer willing seller was a failed move to the land
question in Zimbabwe between 1979 and 2000.
The
Lancaster house agreement was to remain in place for ten years and its
restrictions remain the constant theme (Lebert 2013). This meant that the land
was to change hands under the precepts of the willing buyer willing seller.
Undoubtedly this clause meant that the white farmers who wanted to continue
farming were free to do so. This type of a constitutional procedure meant that
the majority of those who were in need of land remained the land less, herein,
the socio-economic condition of the blacks in communal areas, who constituted ¾
of the population deprived them of land ownership, hence the land problem
remained a million dollar question via the willing buyer willing seller
principle.
Furthermore,
the willing buyer willing seller frame work was associated with corruption were
the top elite benefited more from the land reform (Mabaye 2005). Towards the
end of the first decade of majority rule in Zimbabwe, there were troubling
signs that land distribution and access were being tilted in favour of the new
black elite who were connected to the ZANU PF leadership and who were able to
take advantage of the lack of the clear guidelines for the land reform programme.
Therefore it is clear that the willing buyer willing seller clause was
undoubtedly a failure in solving the land problem of the Zimbabwean majority.
Thus the principle failed to solved the land problem of the majority but
minority.
More
so, the willing buyer willing seller did not dissolve the land problems after
the decade of its operation many people were still in need for land. Freeth
(2010), postulates that irrespective of success achieved with the rural
peasantry the reforms of the first ten years did not fulfil the land hunger of
the land less. In the first ten years, close to three million hectares were
acquired, 52 000 households affecting an insignificant figure of more than 400 000 beneficiaries
hence it is justifiable that the willing buyer willing seller clause remained a
failure in solving the land problem in Zimbabwe.
The
willing buyer willing seller was not successful in acquiring land because the
whites had power to select the land which they wanted to sell. Moyo ( 2005)
postulates that as a consequence of this
poorly designed strategy for land redistribution over 70% of land acquired for
resettlement through the market has been agro ecological marginable and located
mainly in the dry southern regions of the country.
However, the willing buyer willing seller
principle was framework done in a peace full manner also it was associated by
disbursements from the government which were to develop resettlement areas.
According to Dlomini (2006), what distinguishes this phase of gradual land
distribution from the later fast track phase was its peaceful and distribution,
this framework was successful.
To
sum up the above essay, one may argue that the willing buyer willing seller
principle was successful because it was done in a peaceful manner. However,
although it had successes, the willing buyer willing seller principle had many
weaknesses to strengths. It it made redistribution gradual and offered land at
very low prices, allowing white farmers to continue farming if they had the
will to do so, and instead of promoting an equitable redistribution of land it
promoted the protection of white properties. Therefore, this in general did not
solve the land problem in Zimbabwe.
REFERENCES
CFU
(2002) Comments on land reform in Zimbabwe online: WWW.
Mugabe-Zim-land-reform-will-spare-some-white-farmers-comments.
Dlamini
SRA (2006). Taking land reform seriously: from willing seller-willing buyer
to expropriation
Freeth,
B (2010). LAND REFORM AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN ZIMBABWE
ZIMBABWE
HUMAN RIGHT NGO FORUM
Lebety,
T (2013) An Introduction to Land and Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe.
Online: www.foodfirst.org.
Mabaye
T. M. (2005) LAND REFORM IN ZIMBABWE: AN Examination of past and present
policy. Shortcomings& successes and Recommendation for improvement. Online
: www.land
reform in zimabwe.doc
Villiers.
B d. (2003) Land reform: issues and challenges A comparative overview of
experiences in Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Australia JOHANNESBURG.
WWW.
willing buyer willing seller.encyclopaedia.org
